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In this paper, we present an approach to reliability modeling and analysis based on the
automatic conversion of a particular reliability engineering model, the Dynamic Fault Tree
(DFT), into Dynamic Bayesian Networks (DBN). The approach is implemented in a software
tool called RADYBAN (Reliability Analysis with DYnamic BAyesian Networks). The aim is to
provide a familiar interface to reliability engineers, by allowing them to model the system
to be analyzed with a standard formalism; however, a modular algorithm is implemented
to automatically compile a DFT into the corresponding DBN. In fact, when the computation
of speciﬁc reliability measures is requested, classical algorithms for the inference on
Dynamic Bayesian Networks are exploited, in order to compute the requested parameters.
This is performed in a totally transparent way to the user, who could in principle be com-
pletely unaware of the underlying Bayesian Network. The use of DBNs allows the user to be
able to compute measures that are not directly computable from DFTs, but that are natu-
rally obtainable from DBN inference. Moreover, the modeling capabilities of a DBN, allow
us to extend the basic DFT formalism, by introducing probabilistic dependencies among
system components, as well as the deﬁnition of speciﬁc repair policies that can be taken
into account during the reliability analysis phase. We ﬁnally show how the approach oper-
ates on some speciﬁc examples, by describing the advantages of having available a full
inference engine based on DBNs for the requested analysis tasks.
 2009 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
It is well-known that the modeling possibilities offered by Fault Trees (FT), one of the most popular techniques for depend-
ability analysis of large, safety critical systems, can be extended by relying on Bayesian Networks (BN) [2,4,14,22,24,21]. In
[16], we have shown how BNs can provide a uniﬁed framework in which also Dynamic Fault Trees (DFT) [9], a rather recent
extension to FTs able to treat several types of dependencies, can be represented. However, while reliability engineers are
quite familiar with FT-based formalisms, they are not usually comfortable with the use of formalisms like BN and their
extensions. This is also due to the fact that, for reliability purposes, simple and modular techniques are sometimes sufﬁcient
for the deﬁnition of the required analysis framework. Of course, a clear trade-off exists between the simplicity of the formal-
ism and its modeling, as well as analysis capabilities. FTs are maybe the most simple combinatorial formalism in reliability
analysis, but they fail in capturing important aspects like several kinds of dependencies among the system components
[20,2,14]. DFTs overcome some of the limitations of standard FTs, by allowing some kinds of dynamic dependencies among
components. They offer a quite simple and structured framework very useful for modeling purposes, but still quite limited. All rights reserved.
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Nomenclature
2TBN 2 time-slice Temporal Bayesian Network
BK Boyen–Koller algorithm
BN Bayesian Network
CAS Cardiac Assist System
Cov Coverage Set
CovBE basic Coverage Set
CPT Conditional Probability Table
CR Component Repair policy
CTMC Continuous Time Markov Chain
DBN Dynamic Bayesian Network
DFT Dynamic Fault Tree
FDEP Functional DEPendency gate
FT Fault Tree
JT Junction Tree inference
PAND Priority AND gate
PDEP Probabilistic DEPendency gate
RB Repair Box
SGR Subsystem Global Repair policy
SLR Subsystem Local Repair policy
TE Top Event
WSP Warm SPare gate
180 L. Portinale et al. / International Journal of Approximate Reasoning 51 (2010) 179–195from the analysis point of view, especially if more complex modeling features (like for instance repair policies or special
probabilistic dependencies) are required by the application.
The starting point of our work is to make available to reliability engineers a tool where they can take advantage of the
simplicity and modularity of either plain FTs or DFTs, by making them available at the same time a more powerful analysis
engine based on Dynamic Bayesian Networks (DBN). In fact, the quantitative analysis of DFTs typically requires to expand the
model in its whole state space, and to solve the corresponding Continuous Time Markov Chain (CTMC) [9]. The above ap-
proach, even if can be improved through modularization techniques [11], usually suffers from a state explosion problem.
With respect to CTMC, the use of a DBN allows one to take advantage of the factorization in the temporal probability model,
via the conditional independence assumptions represented in the DBN. Moreover, by taking into account the basic features
of DBNs, we aim at offering to the user a set of useful extensions to the basic DFT formalism, like the introduction of sophis-
ticated probabilistic dependencies among the failure of system components, the introduction of speciﬁc repair policies and
the possibility of analyzing the system behavior under the gathering of speciﬁc observations on the system components. Our
approach is based on a translation of the extended DFT model into an equivalent DBN and has been implemented in a tool
called RADYBAN (Reliability Analysis with DYnamic BAyesian Networks) [17]. It allows the design of the reliability model
through a graphical interface where the analyst can access and exploit all the familiar modeling constructs of DFTs, as well
as the supported extensions cited above; the resulting model is then compiled into an equivalent DBN and the analysis is
performed in a transparent way to the user, who has just to specify the desired type of analysis algorithm. This has the
advantage of avoiding the reliability engineer to learn the details of a completely new formalism; in case she/he is not willing
to forsake her/his traditional formalism, she/he can still use it (possibly with few simple extensions) while having available a
more powerful analysis engine.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we brieﬂy review the basic frameworks of DFTs, while in Section
3 we introduce the extensions we have provided to augment the modeling power of the basic formalism. In Section 4 we
recall DBN basics and in Section 5 we sketch the main functionalities of our approach, in particular by taking into consider-
ation, through a running example, the compilation process concerning the provided modeling extensions. Finally, in Section
6, we show a more general application of the approach on a case study taken from [5] and based on a real-world system.
Conclusions are then reported in Section 7.
2. Dynamic fault trees
Fault Trees allow one to represent the combination of elementary causes that lead to the occurrence of an undesired cat-
astrophic event named the Top Event (TE) [2,14]. By specifying failure probabilities on the basic components of the modeled
system (the elementary causes of the TE, also called basic events), the whole system unreliability (probability of the TE) at a
given mission time can be computed. The model assumes every event to be Boolean, with value true corresponding to a
failure event.
In recent years, an effort has been documented in the literature, aimed at increasing the modeling power of FT by includ-
ing new primitive gates, able to accommodate complex kinds dependencies. This augmented FT language is referred to by the
Fig. 1. Dynamic gates in a DFT.
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(FDEP) and the priority AND (PAND).1
A WSP dynamic gate models one primary component that can be substituted by one or more backups (spares), with the
same functionality (see Fig. 1a, where spares are identiﬁed by ‘‘circle-headed” arcs). TheWSP gate fails if its primary fails and
all of its spares have failed or are unavailable (a spare is unavailable if it is shared and being used by another spare gate).
Spares can fail even while they are dormant, but the failure rate of an unpowered (i.e. dormant) spare is lower than the fail-
ure rate of the corresponding powered one. More precisely, being k the failure rate of a powered spare, the failure rate of the
unpowered spare is ak, with 0 6 a 6 1 called the dormancy factor. Spares are more properly called ‘‘hot” if a ¼ 1 and ‘‘cold” if
a ¼ 0.
In the FDEP gate (Fig. 1b), one trigger event T (connected with a dashed arc in the ﬁgure) causes other dependent com-
ponents to become unusable or inaccessible. In particular, when the trigger event occurs, the dependent components are
immediately forced to fail; the separate failure of a dependent component, on the other hand, has no effect on the trigger
event. FDEP may also have a non-dependent output, that simply reﬂects the status of the trigger event; since this dummy
output is not used in the analysis, it can be safely ignored.
Finally, the standard DFT formalism provides another gate called PAND (Fig. 1c); the PAND gate reaches a failure state if
and only if all of its input components have failed in a preassigned order (from left to right in graphical notation). For exam-
ple, in Fig. 1c a failure occurs if A fails before B, but B may fail before A without producing a failure in G.
In the next section we will discuss some particular extensions we have provided to the standard DFT formalism, in
particular by generalizing in a probabilistic way the FDEP gate and by introducing repair modeling features.3. Extending DFTs
We propose some extensions to the DFT formalism, in order to provide the reliability engineer with more ﬂexible
modeling features. In particular, we deal with a couple of new modeling primitives: the Probabilistic Dependency gate (PDEP),
and the RepairBox (RB) [3,7]. The PDEP gate is a generalization of the standard FDEP gate of Fig. 1b, where one trigger event
probabilistically inﬂuences the failure of a set of dependent components. Concerning the second extension, the RB allows to
model the presence of a repair process in the DFT model, in order to turn a set of failed components back to the working state
(Fig. 1d and e). The RADYBAN tool has been recently extended, in order to evaluate DFT models where RB or PDEP nodes are
present, without adding complexity to the underlying DBN-based analysis engine.1 Actually a fourth kind of gate is introduced in the standard DFT model, namely the sequence enforcing (SEQ) gate; however it can be modeled as a special
kind of WSP [15], so it will not be considered in the following.
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We propose to generalize the FDEP by deﬁning a new gate, called probabilistic dependency (PDEP). In the PDEP, the prob-
ability of failure of dependent components, given that the trigger has failed, is parametrized through a speciﬁc parameter
0 6 pd 6 1. The meaning of this parametrization is that, if the trigger event occurs, then there is a given chance (determined
by pd) that the failure on a dependent component will occur as well. We assume that if pd ¼ 0 then the occurrence of the
trigger has no inﬂuence on the failure of the dependent components,2 while if pd ¼ 1, then the occurrence of the trigger imme-
diately causes the failure of dependent components, modeling the standard FDEP gate.
For any 0 < pd < 1 we can assume two possible interpretations or semantics of the gate behavior:
 The trigger, once occurred, persists as active in time, increasing the failure rate of the dependent components, thus accel-
erating their eventual failure.
 The trigger, once occurred, is de-activated, with no future chance of causing the failure of the dependent components, in
case such a failure did not actually occur.
We call persistent PDEP the former interpretation and one-shot PDEP the latter.3
In case of a persistent PDEP gate, the trigger occurrence is assumed to increase the failure rate kA of a dependent compo-
nent A; in particular, the failure rate of A given that the trigger has occurred is determined as bkA, being b ¼ 11pd. Of course, if
pd ¼ 0, then the failure rate of A is unchanged, while in case pd ¼ 1, then kA !1 modeling the behavior of a standard FDEP
gate.
In case of a one-shot PDEP gate, the interpretation of the pd is indeed that of a failure probability. Given that the trigger has
occurred, then the dependent component A immediately fails with probability pd. If A does not fail, then the trigger has no
longer effect and the failure rate of A remains unchanged. Again if pd ¼ 0 the trigger has no inﬂuence on A, while if pd ¼ 1 the
PDEP transforms into the FDEP gate.
Persistent PDEP corresponds to potential causes of the failure of dependent components whose physical inﬂuence persists
over time; this kind of gate can model situations of component degeneration due to external causes. Consider for instance a
set of components, whose function is accomplished in normal conditions under the presence of a control subsystem: the
unavailability of the control subsystem increases the probability of components’ failure over time.
One-shot PDEP, on the other hand, can model a situation of imperfect coverage [1]; suppose that a set of components
depends on the availability of a given subsystem: the unavailability of such a subsystem can be ‘‘covered” by some backup
mechanisms that can be activated only with a given probability. A one-shot PDEP with the subsystem event as a trigger (and
with the dependent components as other inputs) can model such a situation.
3.2. The repair box and the corresponding repair policies
A repair process can be characterized by several aspects; for instance, the target of a repair process can be a single com-
ponent or a subsystem composed by a set of components. In the second case, the repair can be completed at the same time
for all the components, or the time to repair may change according to the speciﬁc component under repair. When we repair a
subsystem, we may be interested in repairing all of its components, or a minimal subset allowing the subsystem to be oper-
ative again. Moreover, a repair process of a single component or of a subsystem, can be activated by the failure of the same
component or subsystem, or such process can be triggered by another particular event, such as the failure of a higher level
subsystem. Other aspects concerning the repair can be the time to detect the failure, the number of components that can be
under repair at the same time, the order of repair of the components, etc.
Deﬁning a repair policy for a repair process means setting all such aspects concerning the repair. In this paper, we consider
several repair policies to be associated with the RB node in the DFT formalism. The ﬁrst policy, called Component Repair pol-
icy (CR), concerns the repair of a single component and is activated by the failure of the same component, as soon as this
happens. The time to repair the component is a random variable obeying to the negative exponential distribution according
to the repair rate of the component.
We represent the presence of a repair process in a DFT model, by means of a RB node. Such node graphically appears as a
wrench surrounded by a square. The attributes of the RB are the associated repair policy, and eventually a repair rate. If a
RB acts according to the CR policy, then the RB has to be connected by means of an arc (a double-line arc), to the basic
event representing the component to be repaired (see Fig. 1d). In this case, a repair rate has to be deﬁned as a parameter
of the RB; this rate rules the time to repair the component. The effect of the repair is turning the component to the working
state; this is modeled by the RB setting to false the Boolean value of the basic event corresponding to the component
(meaning the component is not failed, i.e. it is working correctly). Actually a RB according to the CR policy inﬂuences
indirectly the Boolean value of the events whose Boolean value depends on the value of the basic event connected to the2 It should be clear that, for practical reasons, there is no need of modeling a PDEP gate with pd ¼ 0, since this is a degenerate case where the so-called
‘‘dependent components” are actually independent from the trigger.
3 Another probabilistic extension to the FDEP gate is presented in [25]; however, the semantics is different from our PDEP gate, since the dependent events
are forced to occur probabilistically in mutual exclusion.
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[7] of the RB.
An example of RB according to the CR policy is shown in Fig. 2; this ﬁgure depicts a portion of the larger DFT model in
Fig. 9; this portion represents a subsystem of the Cardiac Assist System (CAS) [5] described in Section 6. In Fig. 2, we model the
presence of the components P, B, CS, SS composing the subsystem CPU_unit (their role is explained in Section 6). The failure
relations among these components are expressed by the Boolean and dynamic gates: P and B are the input events of a WSP
gate; this means that P is the main component and in case of failure, it can be replaced by the warm spare component B. The
FDEP gate forces the failure of both P and B if the event named Trigger occurs, i.e. if the component CS or SS fails. In Fig. 2, a RB
is present as well, it acts according to the CR policy and is connected to the basic event P. This means that as soon as P fails,
the corresponding repair process is activated. The repair process involves the component P, but it may indirectly inﬂuence
the state of the subsystem containing P. Actually in Fig. 2, if both P and B are failed, then the subsystem CPU_unit is failed. If
we repair the main component P, then also CPU_unit turns back to the working state. Therefore, the Cov of the RB in Fig. 2
contains P and CPU_unit.
A repair process may concern a subsystem instead of a single component. In this case, several components are inﬂuenced
by the repair process. The repair of a subsystem can take place according to several policies. We ﬁrst deﬁne the Subsystem
Global Repair policy (SGR), where the repair of the subsystem is activated by the failure of the subsystem itself, as soon as this
occurs. Moreover, all the components in the subsystem are under repair and the repair is completed at the same time for all
the components; such time is ruled by a negative exponential distribution according to the subsystem repair rate.
When we have to repair a subsystem, another possible situation is the case where the time to repair changes according to
the component to be recovered. This holds in the repair policy that we call Subsystem Local Repair policy (SLR) where the
repair of a subsystem is triggered by the failure of the subsystem itself, as soon as it occurs; all its components are inﬂuenced
by the repair process, but the repair of each of themmay take a time different from the time to repair another component. In
this case, a speciﬁc repair rate has to be set for each component in the subsystem. In this policy, we suppose that the repair of
each component is always completed, even though the repair of a subset of the components may be enough to recover the
subsystem.
The SLR policy can be extended in such a way that the repair of the subsystem components is interrupted as soon as the
subsystem is available again, i.e. when a minimal subset of components necessary to recover the system, is repaired. In this
case, some of the subsystem components may not be repaired. We call such policy SLR-min.
In a DFT model, the repair of a subsystem can be modeled by a RB connected by means of arcs to several events (see
Fig. 1e): one arc (the double-line arc) connects the event modeling the subsystem failure to the RB; such event activates
the RB and is called the trigger repair event [7] of the RB. Several arcs connect the RB to the set of basic events modeling
the components to be repaired; such set is called basic coverage set (CovBE) [7] of the RB. The effect of the RB is setting to
false the Boolean value of the elements in CovBE, after the repair process has been completed. Actually the effect of the
RB is not limited to its basic coverage set, but it inﬂuences indirectly also those events whose Boolean value depends on
the basic events in CovBE. The union of the CovBE and the set of the events indirectly inﬂuenced by the RB provides the
coverage set of the RB (Cov) [7].
An example of subsystem repair is shown in the DFT model in Fig. 3 dealing with the same subsystem modeled in Fig. 2,
but with a different repair policy: the RB in Fig. 3 represents the repair of the subsystem CPU_unit instead of a single com-
ponent. This RB is connected to the event CPU_unit triggering the activation of the RB. The CovBE of the RB in Fig. 3 is com-
posed by the basic events P, B, CS, SS; they can be identiﬁed by the arcs connecting the RB to each of them. The coverage set of
the RB contains the basic events in CovBE, together with the events named Trigger and CPU_unit. So, when the subsystemFig. 2. A repair box (RB) modeling the repair of a component (Component Repair (CR) policy).
CPU_unit
SS
P B
Trigger
CS
RB
F W
Fig. 3. A repair box (RB) modeling the repair of a subsystem, in case of Subsystem Global Repair (SGR) policy, Subsystem Local Repair (SLR) policy, or SLR-min
policy.
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associated with the RB. This may inﬂuence the Boolean value of the events Trigger and CPU_unit.
If the RB acts according to the SGR policy, the repair rate of the subsystem has to be set as an attribute of the RB: when
CPU_unit fails, its repair is activated leading to the working state all its components (P, B, CS, SS) and consequently to the
working state of Trigger and CPU_unit; this happens after a random period of time according to the repair rate of the subsys-
tem deﬁned in the RB.
If instead the RB in Fig. 3 acts according to the SLR or SLR-min policy, then a repair rate has to be set for each component
as an attribute of the corresponding basic event. If the policy ruling the RB is SLR, when CPU_unit fails, the repair of each
component of the subsystem starts and will be surely completed after a random period of time depending on the repair rate
of the component. The subsystem CPU_unit may be turn available before that the repair of all the components is completed.
For instance, if CS, SS, P are working, but B is still under repair, CPU_unit is available; the repair of B will be completed even
though it is not strictly necessary to the availability of CPU_unit.
If the policy ruling the RB in Fig. 3 is SLR-min, the repair of each component of CPU_unit (P, B, CS, SS) still starts as soon as
the failure of CPU_unit occurs, but it is interrupted as soon as CPU_unit is available again. For instance, let us suppose that the
failure of CPU_unit was caused by the failure of both P and B (CS and SS are still working). Then, the repair of P and the repair
of B start. If P is repaired ﬁrst, then CPU_unit turns working again, the repair of B is interrupted and B keeps its failed state.4. Dynamic Bayesian Networks
DBNs [8,19,18] extend the BN formalism by providing an explicit discrete temporal dimension. Each time-slice contains a
set of (time-indexed) random variables, some of which are typically not observable [8,19,18]. When the Markov assumption
holds (and in particular when we are dealing with a ﬁrst order Markov process) the future slice at time t þ D (D being the so-
called discretization step) is conditionally independent of the past ones given the present slice at time t [13]. In this case, it is
sufﬁcient to represent two consecutive time slices called the anterior and the ulterior layer and the network is fully speciﬁed
if it is provided with: (i) the prior probabilities for root variables at time t ¼ 0; (ii) the intra-slice conditional dependency
model, together with the corresponding Conditional Probability Tables (CPTs); (iii) the inter-slice conditional dependency
model and CPTs (i.e. the transition model), which explicit the temporal probabilistic dependencies between variables. The
above model of a DBN is usually called 2TBN (two time-slice Temporal Bayesian Network) [18,6]. A DBN (2TBN) is in canon-
ical form if the anterior layer contains only variables having inﬂuence on the same variable or on another variable at the ulte-
rior level. Given a DBN in canonical form, inter-slice edges connecting a variable in the anterior layer to the same variable in
the ulterior layer are called temporal arcs; in other words, a temporal arc connects variable Xti to variable X
tþD
i (being X
t
i the
copy of variable Xi at time t). RADYBAN explicitly uses the notion of temporal arc in its representation.4
Concerning the analysis of a DBN, different kinds of inference algorithms are available. In particular, let Xt be a set of vari-
ables at time t and ya:b any stream of observations from time point a to time point b (i.e. a set of instantiated variables Y
j
i with
a 6 j 6 b). The following tasks can be performed over a DBN:
 Prediction: Computing PrðXtþhjy1:tÞ for some horizon h > 0, i.e. predicting a future state taking into consideration the obser-
vation up to now; this task is called ﬁltering or monitoring if h ¼ 0.4 A commercial tool using the same notion in modeling DBNs is BayesiaLab (www.bayesia.com).
Fig. 4. A DBN for the CPU Unit subsystem.
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(observations) up to now.
Different algorithms, either exact or approximate can be exploited in order to implement the above tasks. In the RADYBAN
tool, theuser canselect either theﬁltering/predictionor the smoothing task, and for eachgiven task she/hemaychoosebetween
using a Junction Tree (JT) inference [12,18] or the Boyen–Koller (BK) algorithm [6], a parameterized inference algorithm that,
depending on the parameters provided (disjoint sets of variables called clusters), may return exact as well as approximate re-
sults. Such algorithms have been implemented by resorting to Intel PNL (Probabilistic Networks Library), a set of open-source
C++ libraries, (http://www.intel.com/research/mrl/pnl), to which we have provided some minor adjustments.
5. Masking DBNs: the RADYBAN tool and the compilation process
Modeling the failure modes of a system as a DBN might be complicated for the standard user of a reliability analysis tool.
Indeed, very often high-level formalism are needed in order to exploit powerful analysis frameworks like the one provided
by DBN. Themain philosophy of the RADYBAN tool is that, in the reliability ﬁeld, drawing the DFTmodel and generating auto-
matically the corresponding DBN, is deﬁnitelymore practical for themodeler. Using such a tool, the user can build its ownDFT
model and then automatically compile the model into the corresponding DBN, on which both predictive and diagnostic infer-
ence can then be drawn.5 In this way, the DFT becomes a high-level formalism allowing the reliability engineer to express in a
straightforward way the relations between the components of the system, whose modeling in terms of DBN primitives would
be less comfortable. On the other hand, since the analysis framework is guaranteed by the more powerful DBN formalism, we ex-
ploit the DFT to DBN conversion to make available signiﬁcant modeling extension at the user modeling level.
In previous works we have shown how to compile standard (D)FT models into (D)BNs [2,16,17]; here we will provide
some details concerning the compilation process of the extensions we provided to the DFT model (i.e. PDEP and RB with dif-
ferent policies). Let us consider again the simple subsystem of Fig. 2, leaving out for the moment the RepairBox RB and by
considering gate F as a standard FDEP gate. The structure of the corresponding DBN (in canonical form) is shown in Fig. 4. The
nodes in the ulterior layer are marked with a # sign following the node’s name, thus if A is a node in the anterior layer, A# is
its temporal copy at the ulterior layer. Temporal arcs are drawn as thicker lines (and connect copies of the same nodes be-
tween the anterior and ulterior layer). In the example, nodes CS# (modeling component CS at the ulterior level) and SS#
(modeling component SS at the ulterior layer) only depend on their ‘‘historical” copy at the anterior layer: in particular, if
we assume an exponential failure rate kCS for CS and if we model the failure of a component as the Boolean value true of
the corresponding node in the DBN, then we compute the conditional probability Pr½CS#jCS ¼ 1 ekCSD, where D is the dis-
cretization step of the DBN, i.e. the amount of time separating the anterior layer from the ulterior layer.6 Of course, if repair is
not modeled, a failure on a component persists over time, thus Pr½CS#jCS ¼ 1. Similarly, for component SS. The Trigger node is
simply the logical OR of CS and SS. The temporal evolution of component P depends on both its failure rate (temporal arc from
node P to node P#) and on the Boolean value of the trigger (intra-slice edge from Trigger# to P#): in particular, when gate F is
assumed to be an FDEP, then the CPT on node P# will set the boolean value true with probability 1 when node Trigger# is
true. Finally, component B acts as a spare component of P, thus its temporal evolution depends on its failure rate (temporal
arc from node B to node B#), on the value of the trigger (similarly to P) and on the value of node P modeling the primary com-
ponent of gateW (inter-slice edge from P to B#). In particular, when component B is operating in place of component P (i.e. node5 RADYBAN allows the user to access the DBN generated by the compilation process and to edit it, as well as to directly build a DBN model, if the user feels
comfortable with such a formalism.
6 The choice of a suitable D should be performed at the analysis level, by taking into account the order of magnitude of the model rates; in particular, the
determination of D should be guided by the fastest changing events, in such a way of being able to capture their relevant consequences.
Fig. 5. A DBN for the CPU Unit subsystem with one-shot PDEP.
Fig. 6. The subsystem failure probability according to the type of functional dependency (using pF ¼ 0:5 in case of PDEP).
186 L. Portinale et al. / International Journal of Approximate Reasoning 51 (2010) 179–195B is false and node P is true), then the CPT entry of B# is determined by the trigger value and by the failure rate kB (i.e.
Pr½B#jB; P; Trigger# ¼ 1 and Pr½B#jB; P; Trigger# ¼ 1 ekBD), otherwise it is determined by the trigger value and the dis-
counted (by the dormancy factor aB) failure rate aBkB (i.e. Pr½B#jB; P; Trigger# ¼ 1 and Pr½B#jB; P; Trigger# ¼ 1 eaBkBD).
The considered subsystem is modeled through a standard DFT and the details of such a compilation into a DBN have been
deeply discussed elsewhere [2,16,17]. In the present paper, we will detail how the PDEP and RB extensions can be introduced
into the compilation process. First of all, suppose that gate F is actually a PDEP gate. If F is a persistent PDEP, then the struc-
ture of the resulting DBN is exactly that of Fig. 4. Indeed, the only difference stands in the CPT of nodes P# and B#. If gate F
has an associated PDEP parameter pF , then the CPT entries corresponding to the true value of dependent nodes and condi-
tioned by a true value of the trigger, will be set according to a modiﬁed failure rate bFk being bF ¼ 11pF and k the failure rate
of the component. For example, the conditional probability Pr½B#jB; P; Trigger# ¼ 1 ebFaBkBD, while Pr½B#jB; P; Trigger# ¼
1 ebFkBD. The other CPT entries are unchanged with respect to the FDEP case.
In case F is a one-shot PDEP, then also the DBN structure changes with respect to the FDEP case, resulting in the net of
Fig. 5. In this case, the dependent components P and Bmust also depend on the trigger status at the anterior layer (inter-slice
edges from node Trigger to P# and B# nodes), since only the transition of the trigger from false to truemay set, with prob-
ability pF , their status to the true value. For instance Pr½P#jP; Trigger; Trigger# ¼ pF , while Pr½P#jP; Trigger; Trigger# ¼
1 ekPD since this models the situation where the trigger has been activated, but has failed in forcing the fault on P. Similar
entries are determined on node B#.
Fig. 6 reports an analysis of the CPU unit failure probability (i.e. the subsystem unreliability), depending on the different
functional dependencies that may be modeled by gate F. The analysis assumes exponential failure rates kP ¼ kB ¼ 0:5E 3 for
components P and B, kCS ¼ kSS ¼ 0:2E 3 for components CS and SS, a dormancy factor aB ¼ 0:5 for the spare component B,
and a PDEP parameter pF ¼ 0:5 for gate F (resulting in bF ¼ 2, doubling the failure rates of the dependent components in case
of persistent PDEP). Notice that, a one-shot probability of failure of 0.5 has a greater impact on the subsystem unreliability
than doubling the failure rates of the dependent components.77 Of course, given the order of magnitude of the failure rates in the example, simply doubling the failure rate is not increasing very much the probability of
failure of a dependent component at the next time instant.
Fig. 7. DBN structure for SGR, SLR and SLR-min policies.
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following a CR policy, as shown in Fig. 2, with an exponential repair rate lP . For the sake of simplicity, let us suppose that
gate F is an FDEP. The resulting DBN structure is again that presented in Fig. 4. A CR policy can indeed be captured at the CPT
level, by substituting the fault persistence assumption (i.e. Pr½P#jP; Trigger# ¼ 1), with the corresponding repair probability.
In the example, the above CPT entry transforms into Pr½P#jP; Trigger# ¼ elPD. Notice that, having a repair policy only on the
P component does not allow to restore the CPU unit subsystem in case of trigger occurrence, since once P is repaired, the
semantics of the FDEP gate assumes the immediate fault of P again (i.e. Pr½P#jP; Trigger# ¼ 1).
Let us suppose now to have a repair policy deﬁned at the subsystem level as shown in Fig. 3. Depending on the particular
policy adopted, different DBNs can be generated (see Fig. 7).
The main idea is to directly model the repair policy through suitable nodes representing the stochastic evolution of the
different processes composing the particular policy. In case a SGR policy is employed, the resulting net structure is presented
in Fig. 7a. Repair box nodes RB and RB# are intended to represent (at the anterior and ulterior layer respectively) the ‘‘global”
repair process modeled by the RepairBox RB of Fig. 3. Such nodes are Boolean nodes where, in case of a SGR policy, the value
true represents a completed repair process. This means that: (a) if the repair is triggered, then the node evolves following
the corresponding (global) repair rate lRB; and (b) when the node becomes true, the components under repair are imme-
diately set to be functional again (i.e. the corresponding node is reset to false). Table 1 shows the CPT for node RB# ¼ true;
notice that, once RB# is set to true, all the subsystem components are repaired, so the CPU unit is reset to false; this
means that the conditioning event of the last entry is impossible (thus any value between 0 and 1 can be used there). In order
to clarify the inﬂuence of the repair box node, Table 2 reports the CPT for node CS# ¼true (similar CPTs are derived for
nodes corresponding to the other components under repair).
The second kind of repair policy we introduced is the SLR policy, concerning the independent repair of a set of subsystem
components, triggered by the failure event of the subsystem. If a SLR policy is adopted in the DFT of Fig. 3, the resulting DBN
is shown in Fig. 7b. Repair box nodes are separately introduced for each repairable component; however, in this case it is
convenient to have a different interpretation of the truth value of such nodes: a repair box node RB assumes value true
if and only if the corresponding repair process is activated (and false otherwise); this differs from the case of SGR policy,
when the true value means that the repair is ‘‘completed”. Given such an interpretation we can set a dependency between
each repairable components and its repair process (the inter-slice edges between repair box nodes and basic event nodes in
Fig. 7b). The CPT of the nodes corresponding to repairable components will then be set by considering both the failure rate (if
the repair is not active) and the repair rate (if, on the contrary, the repair is active). As an example, Table 3 reports the CPT for
node CS#=true in Fig. 7b, under a SLR policy with repair rate lCS and failure rate kCS for component CS. Of course, if the com-
ponent is functional, its failure is determined by its failure rate (ﬁrst two entries of Table 3), if the component is faulty and
the repair is not active, it will persists as faulty (third entry), while if it is faulty with an active repair process, then it will be
probabilistically repaired following the corresponding repair rate (fourth entry).Table 1
CPT for node RB# ¼true under SGR policy.
PrðRB#Þ RB CPU unit
0 false false
elRBD false true
0 true false
Any value true true
Table 2
CPT for node CS# ¼true under SGR policy.
PrðCS#Þ RB CS
1 ekCSD false false
1 false true
0 true false
0 true true
Table 3
CPT for basic event node CS#=true under SLR policy.
PrðCS#Þ CS RB CS
1 ekCSD false false
1 ekCSD false true
1 true false
elCSD true true
Table 4
CPT for node RB CS#=true under SLR policy.
PrðRB CS#Þ RB CS CS CPU unit#
0 false false false
1 false false true
0 false true false
1 false true true
0 true false false
1 true false true
1 true true false
1 true true true
Table 5
CPT for node CS# under SLR-min policy.
PrðCS#Þ CS CPU unit
1 ekCSD false false
1 ekCSD false true
1 true false
elCSD true true
L. Portinale et al. / International Journal of Approximate Reasoning 51 (2010) 179–195 189Repair box nodes are, on the other hand, deterministic nodes whose value is determined by: their previous status, the
component under repair and the trigger repair event. As an example, Table 4 reports the CPT for node RB CS#=true. The
repair box node is set to true when the trigger repair event (CPU unit#) is true; it is also kept to value true in case
the repair is active, the component is under repair and the trigger repair event is reset to false by the repair of another
subsystem component (seventh entry of the CPT). It is set to false otherwise; in particular, the ﬁfth entry of the CPT models
the situation when the repair of the component is terminated.
The DBN in Fig. 7c models the net resulting from the compilation of the DFT of Fig. 3 in case a SLR-min policy is adopted.
In this particular case, the net structure can be simpliﬁed, without explicitly using repair box nodes, and by capturing (as in
the CR policy) the repair processes at the CPT level. The only dependencies that must be taken into account are in fact, those
induced by the trigger repair event on the repairable components. Table 5 reports the CPT for node CS#=true under a SLR-
min policy, with repair rate lCS and failure rate kCS for component CS. Since the component is assumed to persists as faulty in
case the trigger repair event is not active (i.e. third entry of the CPT in Table 5), then if the trigger repair event is reset to
false by the repair of another component, the repair process of CS is stopped. Of course, the repair process is started
(and kept active) as long as both the trigger repair event and the component are faulty (fourth entry). Notice that the
CPU unit in Table 5 plays the same role of the repair box node RB CS in Table 3.
Fig. 8 reports the analysis of the example subsystem, under different repair policies, using a repair rate l ¼ 0:1 for every
local and global repair process, as well as the same failure rates used for the analysis of Fig. 6. The analysis for the CR policy
involves the repair of component P (Fig. 2). As we can see, this does not increase the subsystem reliability in a signiﬁcant
way, with respect to the unrepairable case; on the contrary, signiﬁcant improvements can be obtained by using system re-
pair policies like those of Fig. 3.
6. A case study example
In this section, we aim at showing the general capabilities of our approach, by means of an extensive case study, inspired
by a real-world system illustrated in [5] and representing a Cardiac Assist System (CAS). It is composed of three different mod-
ules named the CPU, the Motor and the Pump units. The failure of either one of the above modules causes the whole system
failure. The CPU unit subsystem has already been introduced in Section 3.2. Failure rates are supposed to be exponentially
distributed and given as fault/hour. The CPU unit consists of two distinct CPUs: a primary CPU P (with exponential failure
rate kP ¼ 0:5E 3) and a backup warm spare CPU B (with dormancy factor aB ¼ 0:5 and kB ¼ 0:5E 3). Both CPUs are func-
tionally dependent on two other components: a cross switch CS (with kCS ¼ 0:2E 3) and a system supervision SS (with
kSS ¼ 0:2E 3); the failure of either the above components will trigger the deﬁnite failure of the CPUs (and so the deﬁnite
failure of the whole CPU unit). However, both CPUs are considered as repairable, under a CR policy, with an exponential re-
pair rate lCPU ¼ 0:1 (corresponding to a mean time to repair MTTR ¼ 10 h).
The Motor unit consists of two motors: a primary motorMA (kMA ¼ 1E 3) and a cold spare motorMB (kMB ¼ 1E 3). The
spare motor turns into operation when the primary fails, because of a motor switching componentMS (kMS ¼ 0:01E 3); this
means that if MS fails before the necessity of the switch (i.e. before the failure of MA), then the spare cannot become oper-
ational and the whole Motor unit fails. Finally, the Pump unit is composed by three pumps: two primary pumps PA and PB
(with kPA ¼ kPB ¼ 1E 3) running in parallel and a cold spare pump PS (kPS ¼ 1E 3). The Pump unit is operational if at least
one of the pump is operational.
Fig. 8. The subsystem failure probability according to different repair policies.
Table 6
The unreliability results obtained by RADYBAN and by GALILEO if repair is not available.
Time (h) RADYBAN (k = 1) RADYBAN (k = 0.1) Galileo
100 0.045978 0.046026 0.0460314
200 0.103124 0.103214 0.103222
300 0.169204 0.169327 0.169336
400 0.241328 0.241474 0.241483
500 0.316482 0.316645 0.316651
600 0.391893 0.392060 0.392066
700 0.465241 0.465408 0.465411
800 0.534745 0.534908 0.534908
900 0.599169 0.599322 0.59932
1000 0.657763 0.657908 0.6579
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responding to the DFT in Fig. 6, is shown in Fig. 7 and is automatically generated given the DFT model, by using our tool,
together with the corresponding CPT quantiﬁcation.
After the conversion of the DFT in the DBN, we can perform the analysis of the latter by means of our tool. First of all, let us
consider the situation when the CPUs are not repairable (i.e. when the two repair boxes of the DFT in Fig. 6 are not present or,
alternatively, when the associated repair rates are 0).
Table 6 shows the unreliability of the system versus themission time varying between 0 and 1000 h (with time step 100)8;
the table compares themeasures computed by RADYBAN (with discretization steps k ¼ 1 h and k ¼ 0:1 h) with those obtained by
GALILEO, a software tool for DFT analysis without explicit repair modeling features and based on CTMC analysis [10].
We can notice that the results are essentially in agreement, with a small difference due to the different nature of the
underlying models of the tools (namely a discrete-time model for RADYBAN and a continuous time model for GALILEO). Such
a difference becomes typically smaller if a smaller discretization step is used. To perform the unreliability computation using
RADYBAN, we just adopted a ﬁltering task by querying node System (i.e. the Top Event) without providing any observation
stream; in other words we performed standard prediction.8 We want to point out that the large number of signiﬁcant digits in the results is usually required by reliability applications.
Fig. 9. The DFT model of CAS.
Table 7
The unreliability results obtained by RADYBAN and by DRPFTproc if different repair possibilities are available.
Time (h) RADYBAN DRPFTproc
CPU repair CPU + Trigger repair CPU repair CPU + Trigger repair
100 0.044283796102 0.011243030429 0.0443301588 0.0112820476
200 0.096916869283 0.027566317469 0.0951982881 0.0276517226
300 0.156659856439 0.054836865515 0.155093539 0.0549629270
400 0.221550568938 0.091957211494 0.220137459 0.0921166438
500 0.289382189512 0.137252241373 0.288119742 0.137437204
600 0.358023554087 0.188778832555 0.356905021 0.188981668
700 0.425606846809 0.244557544589 0.424624354 0.244770740
800 0.490624904633 0.302729338408 0.489768367 0.302945892
900 0.551952958107 0.361649900675 0.551211316 0.361864672
1000 0.608829379082 0.419938921928 0.608191065 0.420148205
L. Portinale et al. / International Journal of Approximate Reasoning 51 (2010) 179–195 191In case we want to analyze the impact of CPU repair, we can compute the system unreliability by taking into consider-
ation the repair boxes of Fig. 6 with the given repair rates lRB P ¼ lRB B ¼ 0:1. Since GALILEO cannot explicit model the repair of
system components, we resort to a comparison with another tool called DRPFTproc [3], based on modularization [11],
conversion to Stochastic Petri Nets of dynamic gates and having repair modeling features [7]. The results of this comparison
(when a discretization step k ¼ 1 has been used for RADYBAN) are shown in Table 7 (second and fourth columns).
Again we can notice the agreement between the different tools (despite the very different analysis techniques). Moreover,
we can also notice that, adopting a repair policy only on the CPUs, does not increase the reliability of the system with respect
to the unrepairable case very much (see Table 6 for a comparison with the second and fourth column of Table 7). This is ex-
plained by the fact that both CPUs are functionally dependent from the Trigger event of the DFT; this means that, once the
trigger is active, then a repair on the CPUs has no effect (since the trigger is going to induce a CPU failure again, because of the
FDEP gate of Fig. 2). Of course, if we want to limit the effect of the trigger, then we can impose a repair policy on the trigger
components as well. Let us suppose that also components CS and SS are subject to a CR policy with rate lCS ¼ lSS ¼ 0:1: this
simply corresponds to add two repair boxes (with such rates) on the DFT of Fig. 6, connected with CS and SS, respectively. The
results concerning the unreliability of the system if also such repair boxes are available are again reported in Table 7 (third
Fig. 10. The DBN corresponding to the DFT in Fig. 9.
Fig. 11. The marginal probabilities in case of ﬁltering. Each curve indicates the failure probability of each subsystem.
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considered), with respect to the previous case.
Notice that using four repair boxes with CR policy on the components of the CPU unit subsystem is not equivalent to have
a single RB with SLR policy on the CPU unit event and with CovBE ¼ fP;B;CS; SSg (see Fig. 3). In the latter, no repair process is
started until the whole CPU unit subsystem is failed, while in the example presented here the local repair processes are
started as soon as the corresponding component fails.9 (see Fig. 10).
Moreover, DBNs (and RADYBAN in particular) offer additional analysis capabilities with respect to standard (D)FT-based
tool lke GALILEO and DRPFTproc. In particular, the possibility of exploiting explicit observations on monitorable parameters,
as well as the possibility of performing smoothing inference; this allows one to rebuild the past history of the system, given a
stream of observations. Consider a situation in which the CAS system (with CPU and Trigger repair available) was observed9 If an SLR policy was adopted, the upper part of the DBN in see Fig. 10 (corresponding to the subnet structure of Fig. 4) would be substituted with the subnet
shown in Fig. 7b.
Fig. 12. The marginal probabilities in case of smoothing. Each curve indicates the failure probability of each subsystem.
Table 8
The joint probabilities in case of ﬁltering. The label of each column indicates the state (0 means working, 1 means failed) of the subsystems CPU_unit,
Motor_unit, Pump_unit, respectively. Bold entries correspond to most probable conﬁgurations.
Time (h) 0,0,0 0,0,1 0,1,0 0,1,1
100 1.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000
200 0.977576 0.003501 0.012862 0.000046
300 0.000000 0.228510 0.643095 0.007708
400 0.110162 0.224175 0.637081 0.022560
500 1.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000
600 0.934621 0.024475 0.033999 0.000890
700 0.870357 0.051434 0.068166 0.004028
800 0.803337 0.079515 0.101124 0.010009
900 0.735453 0.107478 0.131794 0.019260
1000 0.668297 0.134277 0.159387 0.032024
1,0,0 1,0,1 1,1,0 1,1,1
100 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000
200 0.005916 0.000021 0.000078 0.000000
300 0.115366 0.001383 0.003891 0.000047
400 0.000673 0.001357 0.003855 0.000137
500 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000
600 0.005655 0.000148 0.000206 0.000006
700 0.005267 0.000311 0.000413 0.000024
800 0.004861 0.000481 0.000612 0.000061
900 0.004450 0.000650 0.000798 0.000117
1000 0.004044 0.000813 0.000964 0.000194
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observations is consistent with the model, since a repair on the CPU unit can actually repair the whole system; notice that, if
this stream of observation would be provided to the model without repair, an exception would be raised by the DBN infer-
ence algorithms, pointing out an inconsistency with respect to the model provided. Let r be the observation stream about
the system behavior introduced above; a ﬁrst kind of analysis we can perform consists in querying the three modules causing
the fault (CPU, Motor and Pump units), asking for their posterior probabilities given r.
The results concerning the marginal probability of each subsystem over time, from a ﬁltering procedure are reported in
Fig. 11; the joint probability of each possible conﬁguration of the queried subsystems is reported on Table 8. We can notice
that, when the system is observed to be operational, all the three modules must be operational, while when the system is
observed to be faulty (t = 300 h), then there is a high probability that such fault is due to the Motor unit. In particular, by
looking at the joint probability entries, the most probable diagnosis is that the Motor unit is the only module to be faulty.
The CPU unit module is the less probable cause of the fault, since it is repairable. However, since the system is then observed
to be operational again, the most probable diagnosis at time t = 300 h is deﬁnitely wrong, since it should be clear that the
observed system behavior can be explained only by a failure of the CPU unit in the interval (100,300], with a consequent
repair of such a unit (which is the only repairable unit) in the interval (300,500]. This cannot be captured by the ﬁltering
procedure (which is just a systemmonitoring over time); on the other hand, the explanation can be conﬁrmed by performing
the same posterior probability computation above, but under a smoothing inference procedure.
The results from a smoothing inference are reported in Fig. 12 (marginal probabilities of the subsystems over time) and in
Table 9 (joint probabilities of the conﬁguration of the subsystems).
Differently from ﬁltering inference, the above results show that before time t = 500 h Motor and Pump units cannot be
faulty, since at t = 500 h the system must be operational; moreover, by considering that the system behavior has changed
Table 9
The joint probabilities in case of smoothing. The label of each column indicates the state (0 means working, 1 means failed) of the subsystems CPU_unit,
Motor_unit, Pump_unit, respectively. Bold entries correspond to most probable conﬁgurations.
Time (h) 0,0,0 0,0,1 0,1,0 0,1,1
100 1.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000
200 0.993925 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000
300 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000
400 0.993925 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000
500 1.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000
600 0.934620 0.024475 0.034000 0.000890
700 0.870357 0.051434 0.068166 0.004028
800 0.803337 0.079515 0.101124 0.010009
900 0.735453 0.107478 0.131794 0.019260
1000 0.668297 0.134277 0.159387 0.032024
1,0,0 1,0,1 1,1,0 1,1,1
100 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000
200 0.006075 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000
300 1.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000
400 0.006075 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000
500 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000
600 0.005655 0.000148 0.000206 0.000006
700 0.005267 0.000311 0.000413 0.000024
800 0.004861 0.000481 0.000612 0.000061
900 0.004450 0.000650 0.000798 0.000117
1000 0.004044 0.000813 0.000964 0.000194
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particular, since repair is signiﬁcantly faster than failure (because of the given repair and failure rates), smoothing can sug-
gest that such a repair has been probably performed before t = 400 h (since the probability of the CPU unit being operational
at time t = 400 h is close to 1). From time t = 500 h, no observation is available, so both ﬁltering and smoothing will produce
standard prediction results.
In the examples reported in this section exact algorithms (based on the calculation of the junction tree) were adopted,
both for ﬁltering and for smoothing procedures.
7. Conclusions
In this paper, we have described an approach, implemented in the RADYBAN tool, allowing reliability engineers to work at
two different modeling levels, while still having available the full inference power of the DBN formalism. The user who is not
familiar with DBNs can work at the modeling level with DFTs, obtain an automatic transparent conversion into the corre-
sponding DBN, and ask for reliability measures by means of DBN inference algorithms. We have also described some major
extensions that can be provided to the standard DFT model (namely probabilistic dependency gates and repair boxes), that
allow reliability engineers to augment their modeling primitives, while still exploiting the full power of the underlying DBN
model. In particular, modeling repair processes is an important aspect of reliability analysis. However, the standard way of
addressing related issues in FT analysis is typically through an indirect modeling. In fact, it is well-known that in standard FT
the basic components (assumed as independent) can be instantiated with a value corresponding to their unavailability10; this
value implicitly accounts for the repair capabilities. The new gate REPAIR BOX in our formalism (and its compilation to a DBN mod-
el) has a double advantage: (i) the repair can be explicitly included in the model and quantiﬁed according to several repair pol-
icies; and (ii) in the analysis phase, when a stream of observations is assumed for the BN inference, the components with a
repair box may be observed either working or failed (see Section 6).
Concerning the resulting DBN models, we would like to spend a few words about the discretization step; a DBN is a dis-
crete-timemodel and this differs from the underlying model usually adopted in the reliability analysis of a DFT which is usu-
ally a CTMC. As a matter of fact, the two models are not exactly equivalent, since in a CTMC transitions occur in a continuous
fashion. There is a trade-off between the approximation provided by discretization and the computational effort needed for
the analysis: smaller is the discretization step, more accurate are the results obtained (and closer to the continuous case
computation, see Table 6 in Section 6), but greater is the time horizon required for the analysis (and thus the computation
time). In fact, if failure rates are given as fault=hour and we set a mission time of T hours, a discretization step D = 1 h will
require analysis up to step t = T, while a discretization step D = 10 h will only require analysis up to step t = T/10 (since each
step will count as 10 time units); this fact, in DBN inference, will result in a speed up of the result computation, because a
smaller number of time slices have to be considered (i.e. a time-slice in the latter case approximate 10 slices in the former).10 In particular, if exponential failure and repair rates k and l are assumed (with r ¼ kþ l), then the probability of a basic event being failed at time t (i.e. its
unavailability at time t) is computed as 1 lrþ kr ert [23].
L. Portinale et al. / International Journal of Approximate Reasoning 51 (2010) 179–195 195We have presented some examples of the use of the approach, by considering a cardiac assist system (CAS) inspired from
a case study presented in [5]. The results obtained using the automatically generated DBN models are in agreement with the
ones obtained using other analysis techniques described in the literature, when such techniques are applicable to the case
under study. The advantage of our approach is to address modeling features (e.g. probabilistic dependencies or repair pol-
icies) as well as analysis tasks (ﬁltering and smoothing under observation gathering) that are not easily modeled with other
approaches.
We feel that this approach can be a step forward in making available formalisms based on Bayesian Nets to the reliability
community, without asking reliability practitioners to renounce their familiar constructs like those used in FTs or DFTs.
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